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REVITALIZING RATE REGULATION*
SCOPE AND VALIDITY OF TEMPORARY UTILITY RATES UNDER
SECTION 114 OF THE NEw YoRx PUBLIC SERVICE LAW.
T iaD early case of Smyth v. Ames laid down by way of
dictum, the basic principles for the judicial determination
of both the reasonableness of the rates to be charged by pub-
lic utilities and the validity of the method to be used for
ascertaining the value of the investment upon which rates
are to be computed.1 Though contrary to the earlier posi-
tion held by the Supreme Court, these principles have been
generally followed by state and federal courts.2  The com-
* Professor Robert L. Hale, of Columbia Law School, and Professor
William E. Mosher, Director of the Electric Rate Survey, Federal Power
Commission, have read the material of this article and made suggestions and
criticisms of which I have availed myself and this assistance I gratefully
acknowledge. For the contents and opinions expressed in this article I assume
sole responsibility.
1169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898). The court said, at 546:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to reason-
ableness of rates to be charged by a corporation operating * * * under
legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by
it for the convenience of the public. And in order to ascertain that
value, the original, cost of construction * * * the present as compared
with the original cost of construction * * * and the sum required to meet
operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be
given such weight as may be just and right in each case."
Value for rate making is to be distinguished from exchange or commercial value
under the law of eminent domain. In condemnation proceedings, for example,
compensation must be made for good-will and earning power. The elements
of good-will and earning power are excluded as determinants of value in rate
proceedings. See dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. P. S. C., 262 U. S. 276, 310-11, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923).
This distinction, though generally recognized in cases involving valuation
for rate-making purposes, appears to have been disregarded in the recent case
of Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 647, 78 L. ed. 833 (1934),
in which case the court relied on the actual earning experience of the company
under existing rates as a test of their reasonableness. In view of this decision,
it would be more accurate to state, that where the earning experience under a
schedule of rates is available, that such earning experience will not only be a
relevant factor on the question of the reasonableness of the rates, but may, as
in the Lindheimer case, be decisive of the question.
' In the earlier cases, the Supreme Court not only affirmed the right of
the states to determine rates, but refused to pass on the reasonableness of rates,
holding that the question of reasonableness of rates was a matter of legislative
and not judicial determination. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed.
77 (1876).
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missions also adopted them as a rule and guide for admin-
istrative action in order to make sure that their determina-
tion would not be upset upon review. For, though in theory
the courts recognize that rate fixing is properly a legislative
function, in practice the courts have passed judgment both
on the legality of the findings of the commissions and on the
facts of the case.3
A few of the commissions, however, having found that
the judicial method destroyed the effectiveness of adminis-
trative regulation, ventured to adopt simpler and more effec-
tive methods of their own. In line with this trend, the New
York legislature, by a recent enactment, provided a new
method for fixing temporary utility rates.4 This new statute
brings to the fore the ever recurring but interesting question
whether, tested by established principles, the rates to be fixed
by this method would be valid. The purpose of this paper
is to examine the scope of the new statute, study its effect
upon rate regulation and to discuss its validity, giving spe-
cial emphasis to recent decisions bearing upon our inquiry.
I.
The conventional basis for calculation in rate determina-
tion is that rates shall be fixed at such levels that the total
revenues from them shall be sufficient to cover reasonable
operating expenses, plus a proper allowance for deprecia-
tion, plus a fair return upon the fair value of the property
used and useful in the public service. As these elements
fluctuate with changing price levels, adjustments are neces-
sary to keep rates and price levels abreast of each other.
It often becomes necessary to make temporary adjustments,
In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418,
10 Sup. Ct. 702 (1889), 'the court completely reversed its earlier position, and
maintained its right to intervene when rates were so unreasonably low as to
amount to confiscation. This inquiry, as whether legislative action has over-
stepped the danger line of confiscation, "has given rise to the most intricate
and perplexing questions that come up before judicial tribunals." MR. CHARLES
E. HUGHES, SUPREME COURT O THE UNITED STATES, Columbia University
Lectures (1928) c. 6, at 218.,
3 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 289, 40 Sup.
Ct. 527 (1920).
'N. Y. PUBLIC SERVICE LAW (1934) §114.
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by way of temporary rates, pending the final determination
of a rate proceeding. Otherwise, existing rates, no matter
how excessive or inadequate they become because of changed
conditions, would have to remain in effect until the final de-
termination of the rates after a long and involved proceeding.
Such conditions especially arise during periods of economic
crisis. Our present depression is an example. Over night,
the whole economic structure seemed to have crumbled into
a junk heap. The rate schedules adjusted to fit conditions
prevailing before this economic debacle became wholly out
of line with the sudden and unexpected devaluation that
followed. This change required immediate and drastic re-
duction in rate schedules as soon as it became apparent that
the depression would be a prolonged one.
The New York Public Service Commission in 1933 felt
the need for such an immediate reduction in gas and electric
rates. It found "general dissatisfaction with existing utility
rates," and a belief, "that the utilities have not borne their
fair burden of the depression." 5 Accordingly the Commis-
sion determined to establish temporary rates wherever the
facts justified such action. However, in ten cases where
temporary reduced rates were established, "in all but two
instances stays were granted by Justices of the Supreme
Court, and the rates were thus prevented from going into
effect immediately." 6 In sustaining the stay of the lower
court and annulling the order of the Commission, the Appel-
late Division, in the Matter of Rockland Light and Power Co.
v. Maltbie, ruled, that under Section 72, under which the
Commission proceeded, the same method of evaluating prop-
erty for determining final rates applied to fixing temporary
rates, for "the same principles of law apply concerning con-
fiscation as would to rates fixed after a full hearing and
final determination." 7
The inability of the Commission to effect immediate re-
ductions of rates in cases in which such reductions seemed
warranted called for a remedy that would at once remove
the obstacles imposed by the drawn out and cumbersome con-
I N. Y. Public Service Commission Annual Report (1933) at 19.
6 1d. at 9.
" 241 App. Div. 122, 271 N. Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dept. 1934).
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ventional methods for determining valuation for purposes of
fixing temporary rates and at the same time safeguard the
utilities against loss due to inadequate temporary rates.8
By Section 114, the New York State Legislature aimed to
provide such a remedy. This law empowers the Commission,
pending the final determination of any rate proceeding to
fix temporary rates "sufficient to provide a return of no less
than five per centum upon the original cost, less accrued
depreciation of the physical property of said utility company
used and useful in the public service." For the purpose of
fixing temporary rates the original cost of the physical prop-
erty used in the public interest less an allowance for ac-
crued depreciation, is regarded as the rate base or the "fair
value" of the investment upon which a temporary return is
to be calculated. To facilitate prompt action, the Commis-
sion is further empowered to require public utilities to pro-
vide and maintain a perpetual inventory of the property
that is used in the public service and to keep records that
would actually show the original cost of this property and
the reserves accumulated to provide for its retirement or
replacement. By this method, the rate base for thezpurpose
of fixing temporary rates may be kept up to date and cur-
rently available. Finally, as a safeguard against temporary
rates that may prove excessive or inadequate and as a check
upon the reasonableness of both temporary and final rates,
the Commission is further authorized to consider the effect
of such temporary rates in its final determination.
Prior to the enactment of Section 114, the power of the
Commission to fix temporary rates was limited by the statu-
tory requirement that such rates should be made, "with due
regard among other things to a reasonable average return
upon capital actually invested and to the necessity of mak-
ing reservation out of income for surplus and contin-
gencies." 1 The courts, however, recognized as a point of
difference the element of time, i. e., the duration that tem-
porary rates are to remain in effect. The fixing of an early
date for final hearing was an element the courts considered
8Supra note 5, at 13.
" Identical provisions in respect to other classes of utilities are contained in
the following sections of the N. Y. Public Service Law: omnibus, §63 b;'
steam, §85; water, §89 j; telephone and telegraph, §97.
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in favor of sustaining the validity of temporary rates.10
Otherwise, both temporary and final rates were alike in that
they were final for the period they remained in effect and in
that the method of determining the rate base and the rate
of return was the same."
It will prove helpful to this discussion to compare by
way of illustration the basic provisions of Section 114 with
those of Section 72 of the Public Service Law. This latter
Section deals with the fixing of rates for gas and electricity
and contains identical provisions found in sections dealing
with other classes of utilities.' 2 Placed in juxtaposition,
these provisions appear as follows:
SEcTION 72 SEcTIoN 114
RATE BASE
Capital actually expended
and such other relevant facts
as affect proper determina-
tion of the present fair value
of the property.
Original cost less ac-
crued depreciation of physi-
cal property used and useful
in the public service.
RATE OF RETURN
Must be sufficient to pro-
vide a reservation for surplus
and contingencies together
with a reasonable average re-
turn upon the present value
of property as a rate base.
Must be sufficient to pro-
vide a return of not less than
5% on original cost of prop-
erty less accrued deprecia-
tion as a temporary rate
base.
11 Prendergast v. N. Y. Telegraph Co., 262 U. S. 43, 43 Sup. Ct. 466(1923). Though the court enjoined the enforcement of an order prescribing
temporary rates which it deemed confiscatory, it held by way of dictum, that
if the commission "had fixed an early date for the final hearing this might
have been taken into consideration by the court as an element affecting the
exercise of its discretion in the matter of granting an interlocutory injunction."
' Ibid. See also Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana
P. S. C., 283 Fed. 215 (E. D. La. 1922).
1 Supra note 9.
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POWER TO OFFSET AND CORRECT ERRORS IN TEMiPORARY
RATES WHEN FIXING FINAL RATES
No provision. (The tern- The effect of temporary
porary rates being final for rates are to be considered in
the period they remain in ef- final determination.
fect, cannot affect final de-
termination.)
The vital distinction between the methods of valuation
for the fixing of temporary rates provided by these sections,
is that under Section 114, the original cost of the property
and not the present fair value thereof is made the basis for
determining rates. All that would be necessary for comput-
ing temporary rates under'the new section, would be to take
the original cost of property, add new money invested, pro-
vide for depreciation and obsolescence, and simply fix a rate
of return not less than five per centum upon the rate base
thus obtained. The temporary rate thus fixed remains in
effect until the determination of the final rate pursuant to
provision of Section 72, or kindred sections, with this added
proviso, that proper reimbursement may be made for any
errors or deficiencies resulting from temporary rates.
For administrative purposes Section 114 furnishes a
mechanical formula that is definite, stable and easy of appli-
cation. Its d6sirability as an administrative rule and guide
can hardly be questioned. But will it pass judicial muster?
The new statute radically changes the traditional standard
for determining "fair value" for rate making purposes. 13
Such well recognized relevant elements as the present cost
of construction and going value 14 are wholly eliminated in
" The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913). The
court said, at 454:
"It is clear that in ascertaining the present value we are not limited to
the consideration of the amount of the actual investment. * * *. The
property is held in private ownership and it is that property and not the
original cost of it which the owner may not be deprived without due
process of law."
"'The definition of "going value" most often cited is found in the Des
Moines Gas case, 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811 (1915). The statement
reads, at 165:
"That there is an element of value in an assembled and established plant,
doing business and earning money, over one not thus advanced, is self-
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ascertaining the "fair value" base for the purpose of fixing
temporary rates. Original cost alone is considered. In fix-
ing final rates, it introduces and makes available the element
of "actual experience" attending the temporary rate period.
Will these innovations invalidate the rates thus established?
II.
The principles germane to this question have frequently
been stated by the courts and recently repeated by Chief
Justice Hughes in Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v.
Railroad Commission of California.15 There, the court said:
That, "the legislative discretion implied in the rate making
power necessarily extends to the entire legislative determina-
tion as well as the determination itself ;" that the court has
no concern with legislative method, save only as it has "a
definite bearing upon the validity of the result reached," i. e.,
whether the rates as fixed are confiscatory. The distinctive
function of the court in deciding whether rates are confis-
catory is "to examine the result of the legislative action in
order to determine whether its total effect is to deny to the
owner of the property a fair return for its use." The stand-
ard of what is a fair return is not to be measured by "any
artificial formula which changed conditions might upset,"
but a "reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper con-
sideration of all relevant facts."
The applicability of the foregoing principles to the ques-
tion raised in this inquiry first calls for an analysis of their
applicability to the facts and issues raised in the Los Angeles
case. There, the validity of the rates fixed by the Commis-
sion was attacked on the ground that it failed to consider
and give proper weight to either the estimated present re-
production cost of the property 16 or the just and reasonable
evident. This element of value is a property right, and should be con-
sidered in determining the value of the property, upon which the owner
has the right to make a fair return when the same is privately owned,
although dedicated to public use."
289 U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637 (1933).
" The element of "reproduction cost" refers to the hypothetical replacement
cost, as of the time of valuation. Under the "reproduction cost" theory, the
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amount to cover going value. The company had submitted
an estimate of $76,754,914, as the fair value figure, on the
basis of reproduction cost new, using a three-year price unit,
and also an estimate of $9,222,660, for going value. Both
these estimates and elements the Commission rejected, and
determined its rates upon a historical cost basis of
60,704,000 and a fair value basis of $64,082,282; estimating
that 'the rates fixed would yield a return of 7.7% on the
former and 7% on the latter basis.
In its report fixing the challenged rates, the Commis-
sion stated that it followed this method in fixing rates:
"This Commission for many years, in the exercise
of its jurisdiction to establish reasonable rates for
utilities of this character, has fixed rates to yield upon
historical or actual cost of the property, taking land,
however, at current values and depreciation calculated
on a sinking fund basis, a return somewhat in excess
of the cost of the money invested in the property." 17
It accounted for its fair value figure, which was higher than
the historical cost figure by $4,796,000, by its finding that
unit prices properly applicable in prescribing reasonable
rates for the future are higher than those actually paid. It
disallowed the claim for going value, because the cost of
attaching business was charged to operating costs.
Notwithstanding the method used in determining "fair
value," the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the rates.
The majority opinion quoted with approval the following
rule stated in the Minnesota Rate Cases: 18
"The cost of reproduction method is of service
in ascertaining the present value of the plant, when
it is reasonably applied and when the cost of repro-
ducing the property may be ascertained with a proper
present value of the company's property is mainly determined by what it would
cost to reproduce it at price levels and costs prevailing at the time of the
investigation and during a reasonable period in the immediate future. McCardle
v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926).
' 36 C. R. C. 443.
230 U. S. 352, 452, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913) ; italics mine.
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degree of certainty. But it does not justify the ac-
ceptance of results which depend upon mere conjec-
ture * * *. The constitutional invalidity must be
manifest and if it rests upon disputed questions of
fact, the invalidating fact must be proved. And this
is true of asserted value as of other facts."
Applying the foregoing rule, the Court found that the sharp
decline of the price level due to depression rendered the esti-
mates of present reproduction cost, submittd by the Com-
pany, too speculative and untrustworthy to serve as an "in-
telligent forecast of probable future values in order that
validity of rates for the future may be determined." It
concluded that the allowance of $4,796,000 to cover the dif-
ference in unit cost between historical and present cost,
should not have been made in view of the Court's finding that
historical cost had been taken at price levels which were
higher than obtained in the period to which the prescribed
rates are applicable. As to going value the Court held
that the testimony of the Company's witnesses was "too
conjectural" to sustain its burden of proof, and under the
circumstances that the sum which the Commission added to
the historical cost figure to reach its present fair value figure
"may be regarded as applicable to whatever intangible value
the property has as a going concern. The fact that this
margin in the rate base was not described as going value is
unimportant, if rate base was in fact large enough to em-
brace that element."
Mr. Justice Butler, in his dissenting opinion found that
the refusal of the Commission to consider or allow anything
for going value was contrary to law, and the amount omit-
ted in respect to this item was large enough to invalidate
the rates based on a valuation thus arrived at. He therefore
concluded that "the rates should be set aside because arrived
at by an arbitrary method condemned by our decisions."
Had the majority of the Court approached the determina-
tion of the issues raised, from the viewpoint of the validity
of method, rather than result, its conclusion would, in all
likelihood, have been different. Obviously, the Commission,
by excluding the element of going value, pursued a method
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of valuation that admittedly was contrary to prior deci-
sions.19 But the prevailing opinion held that as the total
effect of the method used did not result in confiscation, the
Court would not invalidate that result.
The following principles may be derived from this de-
cision:
1. When total effect of result is fair, the rates
are not confiscatory.
2. When record on appeal discloses a rational
basis for result, the judicial function in references to
issue of confiscation is exhausted.
3. The foregoing presupposes that the adminis-
trative process will accord a complainant a full hear-
ing before final determination, so that all relevant
facts may be available for review upon appeal.20
The criteria established by the decision in the Los
Angeles case point out the approach and basis for the an-
swer to our question. First, as to whether the total effect
of the method prescribed by the new statute would result in
confiscation. The answer is, no. This conclusion is based
on the following considerations. The fixing of temporary
rates under Section 114 is but a step in the administrative
process. The first step in the process is the valuation of the
Company's property on the basis of its original cost and re-
serves accumulated for its retirement and replacement. The
rate-making period commences with the second step, when
temporary or tentative rates are fixed upon the basis of
this valuation. The concluding step in the process is di-
" McCardle v. Indianapolis, 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926).
'"If rates were statutory, their validity would not depend on the procedure
of the enactment but on the resulting effect. Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189
Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619 (1905). Once in effect, however, the principles of the
Los Angeles case would be equally applicable to test their validity. The 75c.
and 80c. per thousand cubic feet gas rates prescribed by the New York State
Legislature, the validity of which was left undetermined in Wilcox v. Consoli-
dated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192 (1909) for lack of "actual experi-
ence of the practical results of such rates" were later invalidated as confiscatory
when such experience became available. Invalidity was established before a
Special Master after an eight-months' hearing at which all facts relevant to the
issue of confiscation were made available for judicial review. Newton v. Con-
solidated Gas Co., 258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264 (1922).
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rected to determining the final rates for the entire rate-
making period, including the initial period during which
temporary rates were in effect.
There is no such finality in these tentative rates as to
preclude the Commission from thereafter disregarding its
findings or changing the entire basis of its order upon its
final hearing. On the contrary, such a change is anticipated
first, by the fact that final rates are to be determined upon
the basis of Section 72, and kindred Sections of the Public
Service Law; and second, by the requirement of the new stat-
ute, that the effect of such tentative rates must be consid-
ered and adjusted upon the final determination. Until such
final determination the status of the temporary rates is not
fixed. When fixed, the final rates embrace results arising
from temporary rates and relate back to the date when they
first came into effect. If, for example, it appears that the
"fair value" base entitles a utility to a return of $100,000
more than it derived from temporary rates, then the final
rates may be increased so that the total result will embrace
the deficiency. This method is analogous to that pursued in
the Los Angeles case. To be sure the state did not, as in the
given example, deprive the investor of something he was en-
titled to and restore it later. To that extent the situations
differ. 1 But as far as the validity of the final result is con-
cerned the principle applicable is the same. In the Los
Angeles case the Court examined the administrative process
as a whole, and though it found that the Commission omit-
ted from the "fair value" base the element of "going value,"
the Court sustained the result because in its total effect "the
rate base was in fact large enough to embrace" the deficiency
arising from the exclusion of the element of "going value."
So, in the example given, since the temporary rates are but
a component part of the rate making process, and the final
rates may be used to compensate for any errors or defi-
ciencies, the total effect of the result is to assure against
confiscation.
This is especially true of Section 114. Its most vital
provision is one that empowers the Commission to consider
The validity of temporary rdtes during temporary rate period is discussed
in Part III of this article.
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and allow for results that actually attend the temporary
rates. This provision may not only be used to cure any
errors shown by the results but also adds a relevant fact
heretofore unavailable in process of rate fixing. It may be
designated as the experience factor, in that the reasonable-
ness of the rates is to be tested by "actual experience."
Its function is twofold: first, the actual experience of the
Company during the period the tentative rates are effective
will serve as a check upon any claim of confiscation based
on other calculations, and second, it will provide a reliable
standard to test the reasonableness of the final rates to be
established. The vital importance of "actual experience" as
a decisive element in rate making was forcibly demonstrated
in the recent case of Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone
C0.22
This case 'involved the reasonableness of the reduced
rates ordered by the Commission in the year 1923. The
Company contested the rates on the ground that the reduced
rates were confiscatory. The lower court, on the basis of
original cost, market value of the land, estimate of repro-
duction cost new, going value and working capital, found
that the average fair value of the Company's property ranged
from 124,200,000 in 1923 to $165,500,000 in 1932. By means
of available experience records, the amount of Company's
net revenue under existing rates and resulting reduction
under the new rates was calculated. For example, it was
found that for the year 1923 the actual net revenue avail-
able for return would have been $5,104,515 under reduced
rates and $6,646,183 on the basis of a fair return on the "fair
value" figure accepted by the Court. This would make a
difference of $1,541,668 between the fair return to which it
was entitled for the year 1923 and the amount it would have
received, if the reduced rates had been effective. Discrep-
ancies in greater and lesser amounts were found for subse-
quent years. The lower court therefore concluded that re-
duced rates were confiscatory in effect and annulled the order
of the Commission.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that, "the find-
ings if accepted would compel the conclusion that when the
54 Sup. Ct. 658, 78 L. ed. 845 (1934).
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Commission's order was made in 1923, not only the new
rates, but the existing rates as well, were grossly confisca-
tory." But it refused to accept these findings, on the ground
that the financial history of the Company showed that dur-
ing the period the alleged existing confiscatory rates were
in effect, the Company, among other things, "paid 8% divi-
dends on its stock," though its stock rose from $70,000,000
in 1923 to $150,000,000 in 1930; that its "fixed capital re-
serves" rose from $37,575,001 in 1923 to $69,242,667 in 1931,
and its surplus and undivided profits, over and above these
capital reserves increased from $5,600,326 in 1923 to
$23,767,381 in 1931. It therefore concluded,
"This actual experience of the Company is more
convincing than tabulations of estimates. In the face
of that experience, we are unable to conclude that
the Company has been operating under confiscatory
intrastate rates. Yet, as we have said, the conclu-
sion that existing rates have been confiscatory would
have been inescapable if the findings below were ac-
cepted. In that event, the Company would not only
be entitled to resist reduction through rates in suit,
but to demand, as a constitutional right a large in-
crease over the rates which have enabled it to oper-
ate with outstanding success. Elaborate calculations
which are at war with realities are of no avail. The
glaring incongruity between the effect of the findings
below as to the amounts of return that must be avail-
able in order to avoid confiscation and the actual re-
sults of the Company's business makes it impossible
to accept those findings as a basis of decision." 22a
The trustworthiness of the evidence in support of its claim
that the new rates were confiscatory having been destroyed,
the Company could not sustain the burden of satisfactorily
proving the invalidity of the rates. In the absence of such
a showing, the decree of the lower court was reversed and
the reduced rates sustained.
"Id. at 663.
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Professor Robert L. Hale,23 analyzing the decisions in
the Lindheimer case, supra, and in Dayton P. & L. Co. V.
Public Service Commission,24 reached the conclusion that by
these decisions the Supreme Court has "substituted a new
test of 'confiscation' for the conventional fair return on 'fair
value' of Smyth v. Ames." In the Dayton case, the Commis-
sion rejected the new schedule of increased rates submitted
by the utility Company. Its order was upheld upon appeal,
in the face of evidence showing that "the rate of return under
the new schedule is set to be 1 28/100 per cent of the fair
value of the property," and that revenue under existing
schedule was even less. Mr. Justice Cardozo delivering the
opinion of the Court, said:
"So modest a rate suggests an inflation of the base
on which the rate has been computed. It is a strain
on credulity to argue that the appellant, when put-
ting into effect a new schedule of charges, was satis-
fied with one productive of so meager a return. * * *
The argument proves too much; the valuations are
discredited by the teachings of experience. * * * We
shall hardly go astray if we prefer the test of conduct."
If the new standard of "actual experience" or "test of con-
duct" will sustain the validity of rates proved confiscatory
by application of old standard of "fair value" then for all
practical purposes the new standard when available alone
controls. To quote from the article of Professor Hale:
"Since the Court prefers conclusions reached by these
'other avenues of approach' to those reached by the
avenue of Smyth v. Ames, the use of the latter would
prove futile to litigants provided the new avenues are
available."
The test applied in the Lindheimer case, however, in so
far as it may be reduced to a formula, has apparent limita-
'Robert L. Hale, The New Supreme Court Test of Confiscatory Rates
(Aug. 1934) JouR. OF LAND AND PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS.
54 Sup. Ct. 647, 78 L. ed. 833 (1934).
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tioifs of availability. It was through mere chance that the ap-
peal in the Lindheirmer case was delayed for over ten years so
that the experience of the Company under existing rates be-
came available for comparison. Had the case come up for final
review at an earlier date the "new avenue of approach" would
not have been available and the result would have been
different, for in the absence of the experience factor there
would be no basis for rejecting the findings of the lower court.
The challenged schedule of rates and the "actual experience"
of the Company were concurrent. This circumstance made
the experience factor a reliable judicial yardstick to measure
the Company's claim of confiscation. Under normal condi-
tions the experience of successful operation under old rates
-- such as paying interest on debts and dividends on stock,
increasing surplus and attracting capital for needed expan-
sion-may show with a sufficient degree of certainty that
the past net earnings are so much more than enough to oper-
ate successfully, that a reduction in future net earnings will
be justified. But changed conditions may void the probative
value of past experience. New elements, such as sudden fluc-
tuations in the purchasing power of money and reduced in-
come due to increased taxes, higher operating expenses, de-
creased demand or competitive enterprises, may render the
results of past experience too conjectural to afford a basis
for an intelligent forecast of the Company's ability to oper-
ate successfully under reduced rates and changed conditions.
When past experience under such circumstances fails as a
guide the "avenue of approach" which was used in the Los
Angeles case, supra, may be the one to be preferred. In view
of the Court's policy not to adopt "any artificial rule or for-
mula which changed conditions might upset" it is most likely
that the judicial method of approach applied in the Lind-
heimer case will only serve as an additional test of "confis-
cation" except as in the latter case, where "reasonable judg-
ment having its basis in a proper consideration of all rele-
vant facts" made the available experience the only reliable
test.
One of the advantages to which Section 114 may be put
is that it makes the experience factor available in all rate
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cases before the determination of the final rates. 25  Under
the new statute the rates are only tentative until their ef-
fect may be measured by actual results. If conclusions based
on other calculations prove contrary to the actual experience
attending the temporary rate period, the calculations will be
disregarded. On the other hand, actual experience may in-
dicate a more reliable basis for fixing final rates. It may
show that lower rates have so stimulated and increased use
as to result in lower unit costs. Obviously, the sending 'of
more gas through existing mains or more electricity over
existing wires may more than compensate for the losses
caused by lower rates and result in the same or increased
net earnings.26 If, however, actual experience shows a loss
"The application of the test of "actual experience" must necessarily vary
with circumstances. In the Los Angeles case, supra, the court intimated that
"actual experience in the construction and the development of the property,
especially experience in a recent period may be an important check upon
extravagant estimates." In the Dayton case, supra, it was the acquiescence of
the utility company in rates which their calculations proved confiscatory, that
discredited the valuations based upon them. In both of the foregoing cases as
well as in the Lindheimer case, the test applied was judicial, i. e., whether in
the light of actual experience the final result may be deemed confiscatory. The
new statute sets up actual experience as an administrative guide for constructive
action. The fact that this administrative yardstick approximates the judicial
yardstick applied in the Lindheimer case, in measuring the actual yield the new
rates are likely to give and their sufficiency to maintain adequate service,
attract fresh capital and meet such other demands upon the company as seem
just and reasonable, tends to bring the administrative and judicial processes in
closer harmony and thereby makes more certain the validity of the final result
as a constitutional question.
' Frank R. McNinch, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, cites
by way of illustration the experience of the District of Columbia. The method
there used is based on an agreed valuation of the company's property and a
sliding scale of rates. Whenever the company earns a return of more than
732% in any year, it must devote half of the excess the next year to reduced
rates. By means of this sliding scale the domestic rates in the national capital
have been gradually reduced within the past ten years from 10 cents to 3.9
cents per kilowatt hour. During the same period the annual kilowatt con-
sumption per customer increased from 456 to 868 or almost double. Notwith-
standing this reduction, the increased consumption enabled the company to
increase net earnings on its common stock from $26 to $68, and the company's
annual return on its investment has averaged 10%. 78 CONG. REC. (1934) 9311.
Though the sliding scale method has proved successful in Washington, it
is well to bear in mind the peculiarly favorable conditions there prevailing.
Washington is a compact residential city. The cities in New York are indus-
trial. It is doubtful whether promotional rates will increase industrial con-
sumption as they do domestic consumption.
In view of this essential difference and the difficulty of agreeing upon a
valuation of the company's property (see Power Authority Report, N. Y.
Times, March 5, 1935, p. 8), it is submitted that New York utilize the method
of temporary rate fixing contained in the new statute to accomplish the bene-
ficial effects of the so-called Washington Plan.
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in net revenue, the extent of the loss will be definitely known
and given proper effect in the final determination. In either
event accuracy takes the place of surmise and factual data
replaces expert guesswork. An experimental device is made
available whereby the relationship of lower rates and in-
creased use may be tested and the interests of both consumer
and investor against loss safeguarded during the experimen-
tal or temporary rate period. Finally, a relevant fact is in-
troduced for the consideration of both the commission and
the court of review, that will not only aid in reaching a fair
result but may be decisive of the validity of the result as a
constitutional question.
III.
Thus far the inquiry has been confined to the ultimate
effect of the new statute upon permanent rates. The re-
mainder of this discussion shall concern the validity of the
new method in determining temporary rates. On its face,
the new statute limits the hearing for the fixing of tempo-
rary rates to a consideration of a return of not less than five
per centum upon the original cost of the company's physical
property less accrued depreciation. What the fair rate of
return should be, on the basis of the present "fair value" of
the property is left for subsequent determination. Should
the company appeal from the order establishing temporary
rates, the record on appeal would be limited to the proof
embraced within the provisions of the statute, i. e., the re-
turn on ' the original cost of the company's investment less
accrued depreciation and the court of review could not tell
therefrom whether the return upon the basis of the present
fair value of the investment is confiscatory. If such be the
necessary effect of the statute, does it not come within the
condemnation of the rule, "that if the company is deprived
of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its
property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of
an investigation by judicial machinery it is deprived of the
lawful use of its property and thus in substance and effect
of the property itself without due process of law." 27 The
I Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct.
702 (1889).
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question thus raised brings the discussion to the inquiry,
whether the Legislature in the exercise of its police power,
in order to prevent the charging of unreasonable rates dur-
ing the pendency of a rate proceeding, may accomplish that
purpose by requiring a public utility to accept, subject to
subsequent adjustment, less than a fair return upon the
present "fair value" of its property in the public use.
The function of the court in dealing with new legisla-
tion has often been stated and applied. The earlier view was
well expressed in Matter of Jacobs,28 where the court said,
"In order that a statute or ordinance may be sus-
tained as an exercise of the police power, the Courts
must be able to see that the enactment has for its ob-
ject the prevention of some offense or manifest evil
or the preservation of the public health, safety, morals,
or the general welfare; that there is some clear, real
and substantial connection between the assumed pur-
pose of the enactment and the actual provisions
thereof."
The implication is that the Court assumes to judge whether
the object or intent of the enactment is actually to correct
some offense or manifest evil and that there is a real connec-
tion between the provision of law and such assumed purpose.
Such was tlie view expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice McReynolds, in the recent case of Nebbia v. New
York,29
"But plainly, I think, this Court must have re-
gard to the wisdom of the enactment. At least we
must inquire concerning its purpose and decide wheth-
er the means proposed have reasonable relation to
m98 U. S. 98, 24 L. ed. 112 (1884) (italics mine)..
291 U. S. 502, 539, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934). Pursuant to a New York
statute which established a Milk Control Board and empowered it "to fix
minimum and maximum retail prices to be charged by stores to customers," the
Board fixed nine cents as the minimum price to be charged by a store for a
quart of milk.
The order of the Board was attacked as repugnant to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
something within legislative power-whether the end
is legitimate and the means appropriate."
As against this is the view expressed in the prevailing
opinion in the Vebbia case, wherein the court said at page
537:
"So far as the requirements of due process are
concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional
restrictions, a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The Courts are without au-
thority either to declare such policy, or, when it is
declared by the legislative arm, to override it. If the
laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose and are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory the requirements of due process
are satisfied, and judicial determination to the effect
renders a court functus officio. * * *"
Here are sharply and clearly brought out two recurring
conflicting views as to law. One, the rule in the Nebbia
case, that the court will not assume to determine whether
the enactment is necessary or the policy adopted wise, or the
means used adequate or practicable-that is the positive
function of legislature; the negative function of the court is
simply to determine that the enactment is not unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected has a
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained. The other view-that the court "should interfere
and balance its judgment against that of the legislature as
to the tendency of the legislation in question to meet existing
evils" and that therefore it has the positive duty in deter-
mining not only whether the end is legitimate but also
whether the means are appropriate3 0
The new statute comes within the operation of the pre-
vailing opinion in the Nebbia case. Its purpose is "to facili-
'John B. Cheadle, Government Control of Business (1920) 22 CoL L.
REv. at 576.
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tate prompt action by the Commission in proceedings involv-
ing the reasonableness of rates." This appears both from
the wording of the statute itself and the report of the Com-
mission recommending its enactment.3 1  To be sure, com-
missions generally aim to base future rates upon a forecast
of future values and thereby anticipate the need for fre-
quent and prompt rate changes. But recent experience has
shown how unreliable forecasts made by the conventional
method of rate making prior to the period of depression are
for conditions now prevailing. Even in normal times, rate
schedules often become obsolete after a short period of time.
This may be due to technological advances, which may reduce
operating costs, or shifts of industries and population, or
new types of competition, or changes in property values. Ac-
cording to the Tennessee Railroad Commission any value
arrived at as of a particular time would not necessarily be
true one year or even six months hence.3 2 William A. Pren-
dergast, former chairman of the New York Commission,
estimated the probable life of a rate valuation between five
and six years, adding that "the period of validity would
necessarily depend on whether prices remain stable or not." 33
It therefore 'follows, that when price levels are not stable-
and such has been the condition during the war and post-war
period and since 1930,34 that rate changes must be made every
two to three years, and when price levels are stable, every
five to six years.
The present cumbersome method of fixing temporary
rates prevents prompt action when it is most needed. Ac-
cording to the New York Public Service Commission, the
sharp decline in prices would have entitled the consumers
of gas and electricity to a reduction of $28,000,000 from rates
in effect in 1930.3r Yet the Commission was able to effect
but a part of this reduction, and that mainly by negotiation
Supra note 5, at 13, 14.
18th Biennial Report (1930) at 58.
N. Y. Commission on Revision, Hearings, Vol. I at 382.
Bulletin on Wholesale Prices: U. S. Dept. of Labor, June, 1934. The
dollar fluctuated so much in its buying power that $1.00 of 1926 had a value
of $1.46 in 1914; $1.17 in 1916; $.85 in 1917; $.64 in 1919; $1.03 in 1921; it
was fairly stable for the years 1921-1929 and began to again fluctuate at $1.15
in 1930; $1.32 in 1931; $1.54 in 1932; $1.51 in 1933; and $1.34 in June, 1934.
= Supra note 5, at 25.
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and voluntary reductions rather than by statutory methods.
The sum of $9,500,000 is tied up in litigation, the outcome
of which is problematical. The orders affecting this total
sum have been attacked on the ground that the methods used
were unlawful and arbitrary and the results reached con-
fiscatory. The Appellate Division, in the Matter of Rockland
Light and Power Co. v. Maltbie,36 by a unanimous opinion
sustained the Company on both grounds and annulled the
order affecting an annual reduction of $119,000. It is quite
possible that if the proceedings were as comprehensive as the
law requires, the result would have been different. But the
Commission was bent on immediate reductions and adopted
a method which though suitable for its needs was condemned
by the court.3 7 In either event the ratepayer is out of pocket.
If the Commission awaited a complete investigation the rate-
payer meanwhile would have to pay prevailing rates until
new ones were established, no matter how excessive the ex-
isting rates were. Having instead proceeded in the manner
stated in its announcement and followed in the Rockdand
case, it invited annullment of its order upon appeal, so that
'241 App. Div. 122, 271 N. Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dept. 1934). In its annual
report (1933) the New York Commission had commented on a similar holding
as follows, at p. 13:
"As pointed out in the opinions adopted by the Commission, this
doctrine would practically nullify the power of the Commission to fix
temporary rates, for if a value must be found before a temporary rate
can be fixed, action by the Commission will be delayed until the case is
nearly or quite ready for final adjudication." Supra note 5, at 13.
The Commission announced the method which it pursued in fixing tempo-
rary rates, as follows:
"After careful consideration the Commission has determined to establish
temporary emergency rates wherever the facts relating to a company, set
forth in the sworn reports to the Commission, seem to justify such action.
It is contemplated in the establishment of such rates that a valuation of
the property as required by the courts for a final determination will be
made. Such valuations require lengthy procedure, wearisome hearings,
and often extended litigation. As a result regulation is frequently char-
acterized as dilatory and cumbersome, and commissions are blamed for
lack of prompt action when they are helpless to remedy the situation."
Supra note 5, at 18.
This method, however, comes within the condemnation of the decision of
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248, 54 Sup. Ct. 146
(1932), wherein Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the court, said:
"And the prospect that a hearing may be long does not justify its denial
if it is required by the essential demands of justice."
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the reductions again must await the date of final determina-
tion. Irrespective of the final determination, there is no way
to reach the surplus profits of the Company or to reimburse
the ratepayer for his losses. This arises from the rule that
"temporary rates fixed by Commission are final legislative
acts as to the period during which they are to remain in
effect." 38 Being final, the surplus gains derived from tem-
porary rates cannot be used to sustain future final rates, that
standing by themselves, are confiscatory.$9
The present method of regulating temporary rates, being
inadequate and ineffective, the Legislature was justified in
seeking an appropriate remedy. The difficulty lay in devis-
ing a means that would accomplish the desired result and at
the same time be flexible enough to safeguard the property
interests of the investor. It is apparent that such is the in-
tended object of Section 114 and that there is a real and sub-
stantial relation between the provisions of the law and the
object sought to be obtained. Provision is made for three
separate steps in the process of fixing temporary rates. The
first or preliminary step in the process is the preparation of,
an inventory of the Company's property. For that purpose
the Company is required to maintain a perpetual inventory
of property which currently shows the book or original cost
of the Company's property and accrued depreciation reserves
accumulated for its replacement and retirement. By this
method there is established a rate base currently available
to fix temporary rates. This requirement is not arbitrary.
One of the principal causes of delay in a rate case is the
preparation of inventories, for such inventories are a pre-
requisite to the making of a valuation and in some instances
their preparation is not begun until the rate proceedings
are started and in case of a large company a considerable
time is required for its preparation.
The second step is the ascertainment of a tentative base
upon which to calculate the temporary rate of return. The
statute designates the original cost of the Company's prop-
'Supra note 10.
'Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 271 U. S. 23,
46 Sup. Ct. 363 (1926); Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U. S. 165, 42
Sup. Ct. 264 (1922).
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erty used in the public service, less accrued depreciation, as
such rate base. The choice is not arbitrary. Original cost
though not conclusive is always a factor in every valuation.40
Of all the elements considered in determining fair value, it
is the most definite, stable and easily ascertainable. It con-
stitutes a rough index to fair value upon which the final
rate of return is to be computed. When price levels are
stable it fairly represents the present fair value of the Com-
pany's property. In Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission,41 the order fixed rates on the basis of orig-
inal cost of production. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court
held that the Commission correctly followed the rule in
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra, which held, "that
actual costs will continue fairly well to measure the amount
to be attributed to physical elements of the property so long
as there is no change in the level of applicable prices." In
periods of price decline, original cost will obviously be a fair
basis to a utility to measure the present "fair value" of its
property. The recent case of Los Angeles Gas & Electric
Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, supra, sustained
rates based on historical or original cost figures, on the
ground that the serious price decline made original cost esti-
mate more trustworthy as a basis for present fair value than
the present reproduction cost estimate. It is only in periods
of rising prices, when original costs being less than repro-
duction cost, may therefore not fairly represent present "fair
value." This contingency may be met by the third step,
which consists in fixing a temporary rate of return.
The only limit imposed upon the Commission in fixing
such rate of return is that it must not be less than five per
cent. There is no limit placed upon the maximum rate of
return. Heretofore, utility Commissions usually treated the
rate of return as the static and fixed factor in rate making. 42
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U. S.
287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637 (1933).
41290 U. S. 632 (1934).
2The summary submitted by the Public Service Commission of New York
and published in the report of the New York Commission on Revision, Vol. 3,
pp. 2826-2830, shows that in the war and post-war period of 1916-1921, in spite
of abnormal fluctuations in price levels (see note 34, supra) a flat rate of 8%
was prescribed in over 70% of all cases decided in formal rate proceedings. It
is to be further noted that cases related to all types of utilities.
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The new statute in order to facilitate prompt action, makes
the rate base the stable element. Of necessity, the rate of
return must become the variable and adjustable factor. By
this means high price levels may be offset by appropriate
upward adjustment in rate of return. As was stated in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis: "Either increase
in the rate of return or increase of the base on which return
is measured would have served to adjust compensation to
higher price levels." 43 This flexible medium of control may
also be used to assure an operating company a net revenue
that is sufficient to attract capital for needed improvements
and to enable it to properly discharge its public duties dur-
ing the pendency of proceedings. If, for example, at the hear-
ing for the fixing of temporary rates, the utility shows that
a five per cent rate of return on basis of book value of its
property would impair its credit or b6 insufficient to maintain
a proper standard of service, or result in the deterioration
of its property, it would be comparatively a simple matter
to adjust the rate of return to avoid such injury to either
the investor or the ratepayer.
What has been said as to the use of original cost as a
basis for determining value is equally applicable to its use
as a basis for calculating depreciation. Though accounting
practice treats depreciation as part of the original cost of
fixed assets retired or to be retired from service, the law re-
quires that depreciation equal the cost of wornout equipment
at the time of replacement.44 When book cost and value are
"3St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 488, 49
Sup. Ct. 384 (1929).
"United Railways v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct. 123 (1930). The
reasoning and conclusions reached by the majority opinion were forcibly
assailed in the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis. Mr. Justice Stone, in a separate
dissent, summed up the objections as follows:
"To say that the present price level is necessarily the true measure of
future replacement cost is to substitute for a relevant fact, which I should
have thought ought to be established as are other facts, a rule of law
which seems not to follow from Smyth v. Ames, and to be founded
neither upon experience, nor expert opinion and to be unworkable in
practice."
A very pointed and logically unassailable criticism of the rule which requires
the public to amortize on the basis of reproduction cost is contained in the
opinion of Commissioner Maltbie, In re Yonkers Railroad Co., P. U. R.
(1933) B., pp. 61, 84.
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not materially different in amount then book cost may con-
veniently and with approximate accuracy be used to measure
value and depreciation. When, however, cost and value are
materially different in amount, then, the difference in both
value and depreciation may be properly adjusted during the
pendency of proceeding by a higher or lower rate of return,
or be offset by higher or lower final rates. By proper ac-
counting practice, a fair net result may be obtained for the
entire rate making period.
It is conceivable that during periods of rising operating
costs and price levels, such as we experienced in 1922 and
to some extent are now experiencing, that the Commission,
after a preliminary hearing such as is provided by Section
114, may order a temporary rate reduction that will impair
the credit and ability of the company to render adequate
and efficient service. To be sure the Commission may abuse
the powers conferred upon it by the new statute as it may
abuse its other regulatory powers. In the advance of such
abuse the court will not pronounce anticipatory judgment.
As the court said in an earlier case:
"It is not our province * * to pronounce anticipatory
judgments. We must wait for the instance. Our
present duty is to pass upon the statute before us,
and if it has been enacted upon a belief of evils that
is not arbitrary, we cannot measure their extent
against the estimate of the legislature." 4
When the "instance" does arise, the utility is not left
without a remedy. It may avail itself of the remedy pro-
Vided by Section 23 of the Public Service Law, whereby a
court may stay or annul an order fixing inadequate rates
upon a showing that great and irreparable damage would
otherwise result. Or it may resort to the provisions of Sec-
tion 72, and kindred sections, whereby an immediate tem-
porary increase in rates may be allowed when such increase
is necessary to provide adequate and efficient service or to
preserve the property. Even in the absence of these provi-
sions the rate of return under Section 114 may be shown to
"
5Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 385, 36 Sup. Ct. 379 (1916).
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be inadequate for the present needs of the company. Though
the hearing provided by the new statute sets a limit to the
minimum rate of return and also limits the Commission to
a consideration of the original cost of the property as the
temporary rate base, it sets no limit to the maximum rate
of return. Whether the temporary rate of return shall be
the minimum of 5 per cent or higher is left to the discretion
of the Commission. What shall control the exercise of this
discretion? Obviously, the experience of the company show-
ing its actual cost of operation, upkeep, capital charges and
capital for needed expansion. The preliminary hearing will
necessarily deal wtih all such matters and the company's
right to appeal will be co-extensive with the scope of hearing.
The one important matter, however, that the prelim-
inary hearing will not consider is whether the temporary
rates standing by themselves are confiscatory for the period
they are to remain in effect. That issue must await the fihal
determination. At this point the private advantage of the
investor conflicts with the public need. But as the object
of the new statute is to assure more effective rate regulation
by means reasonably deemed by the legislature to be justifi-
able and appropriate, this private advantage should give way
to the public interest. The reasoning of the majority opin-
ion in the Nebbi case lends support to this view. Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts speaking for the court, said:
"These correlative rights, that of the citizen to exer-
cise exclusive dominion over property and freely con-
tract about his affairs, and that of the state to regu-
late the use of property and the conduct of business,
are always in collision. * * * But subject only to con-
stitutional restraint the private right must yield to
the public need." 46
And again in the same case, he said:
"But if, as must be conceded, the industry is subject
to regulation in the public interest, what constitu-
tional principle bars the state from correcting exist-
'o Supra note 29, at 524.
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ing maladjustments by legislation touching prices?
We think there is no such principle. The due process
clause makes no mention of sales or prices any more
than it speaks of business or contract or buildings or
other incidents of property." 47
If there is nothing sacrosanct about the prices which
may be charged by those engaged in the milk industry-not
commonly regarded as a public utility-there should be noth-
ing sacrosanct about the temporary rates which may be
charged by those engaged in an industry that is a public
utility. Just as the private right of the dairy farmer must
give way to the need of the consuming public, "in order to
correct existing maladjustments," so the private advantage
of the investor in a public utility should for like reasons
give way to the public interest. Considering the safeguards
with which Section 114 has buttressed the investors' rights,
the grounds for his objection seem even less tenable.
IV.
The new statute marks a forward step in rate regula-
tion. It reinforces the regulatory authority at one of its
weakest points. Heretofore, the Commission was at a dis-
advantage in fixing temporary rates. It lacked the data and
therefore the means to uphold its mandates against attack.
As a result it was often obliged to resort to compromise in
order to obtain for the ratepayer some measure of immediate
relief. Commendable and necessary as that practice was
under the circumstances, it was nevertheless a confession of
the impotency of the power of the Commission to ,carry out
its mandate to establish a "fair return on fair value." The
power now given to the Commission to command as well as
to advise does away with the need for makeshift compromise.
In making the experience factor available in rate fix-
ing, the new statute makes possible more accurate and scien-
tific rate making. How helpful that factor can be and what
credence the Supreme Court will give it, clearly appears
"'Id. at 531.
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from the decisions in the Lindheimer and Dayton cases,
supra. In the light of these decisions, experience and orig-
inal cost factors, taken together, might well provide a fac-
tual and stable basis for rate making in periods of stable
and fluctuating prices.
Finally, by means of the adjustable rate of return in
fixing temporary rates and adjustment to be made upon final
determination, a "fair return on fair value" may be kept
currently up to date. Such continuous adjustments are made
necessary because of fluctuating price levels so that net rev-
enue will keep abreast of the purchasing power of money.
Temporary rates, easily established, scientifically checked
and adjusted upon a factual basis, may effectively be used
to attain this result.
In the introduction to their valuable book,45 to which
this writer is greatly indebted, Messrs. William E. Mosher
and Finla G. Crawford, make this observation: "The out-
look for constructive action is not unpromising, because of
the aggressive action being taken by a few pioneering Com-
missions, because of the attitude adopted by some of our in-
fluential public officials, because of bills proposed in several
legislatures. * * *" The new statute is one of these bills.
It was wrought with skill and foresight and promises to
revitalize the whole process of rate regulation.
PINCUS M. BSRK5ON.
New York City.
'WILLIAM E. MOSHER AND FINLA G. CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGU-
LATiON (1933) New York.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
M.
Illustrious son, to your illustrious sire
You now ascend. Farewell. Long did you stand
A glowing light. A scintillating strand
Of erudition. Sanguine hopes retire
To grieve, and wait, and sue that time inspire
Another champion for the mute demand
Of future years, when all our stone is sand
And all our hatchments sunk in time's soft mire.
Now to your last account you turn your pace,
From man-made wings; to don a golden wreath
And lend, to fair Justitia's court, your grace.
While to a peering world, do you bequeath
Perception, in perpetual estate,
That future forces may articulate.
Hyman Frank
m
